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Abstract
This paper anlalyzes Senegal's  experienice with  With  it tlcemebndcous  ilmlpr Ov'Cllmellt  In  sector  performance.
teleCon1ILnicarions  lilberalizationi  and privatization.  Bctween  1997  and 200 I  fixed-line telepholic
Scnegal  privatized its inciuimbenr  operator  in  1997, and  penetrationi grew  fromil  1.32 to 2.45  pel  htIlidied pcople,
granted  the newly  privatized firml seven  !years of fixed-  while mobile  penetrationi skyrocketed  from()  0.08  to 4.04.
line  exclusivity While  introducing  "inanagcd  Buit it is still  too early  to assess  the validity of granting
comilpctition"  in the ecilular market  and  free coiilpctitioln  fixed-linle eXClUSiVitV  to  il  incumbenit opcrator.  \Whi ic
in  valiue-added scrvices (VAS).  Byi  M/lay 200 1,  twVo  cellular  penetrationi increascd,  the operator  did nor mnect
operatrl-s,  a nuiber of VAS  providers, and  thousands of  objectives regarding  rural telephony.  NMtorcover,  fixed-
retailers operating  telecenters had  cnte-ed the  mal-ket.  line penetration  increased  in areas  where  the operator
Reforimi  has  thulS significantly  chlianged  the landscape of  faced competitioni  from  a  milobile provider.
Scnegal's  telecommllfunicatiols  scCtrol-  and  has  brought
[Iihis paper-a p-roduct of RCgulatioll  and Competition  Policy, Development  Reseaclh (Group-iS  parrt of a  larger effort  in
the groulp to promiotc telCcommlLInIicationIs  conipetition, liberalization,  and privatization in Africa. Copies of thc paper are
av\ailaiblc fr-ce  from  the Worldl  lanik,  18  I 8 H Strcet NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please contact Paulilna Silrtilml-Aboagye,
room  .N1CM3-422,  tclcpiioone  202-473-  S26,  fax  202-522-1  1,55,  email  acidress  psintiniaboagye'  worldbank.org.  Polic\
Research  Wo\rkiiig Papers  arc also posted  on  the  \Wel  at http://ccon .wor-ldbaik.org. Jean-Paul  Azam  may  be conitacted  at
azamn(i  univ  tlse.fr. Septemlber  2002.  (47 pages)
The  P'lnic  y  Rescrcln  . ' . IPaper Serins disseniinmties  tlst'  findihngs oft urk ill  lprnoress to enllclmaer  the  exch'an7ge  nf idcas ab/s  ct
dii  L  /'Oell//l'lt  issues.An  . blectir'  ue  f the  senes itoi  get th  findingS olit quici)  .ebveln  ii  tbie p/resnt'ltii  sallr  eless th:i1 fiuilyp  Pishedl. Tbe
p.lpers Car,70  tl'e niiiiies of tlbea  .itbrs  anid sbnoild be  cited acclldinglv.  I  be  ni)liiugs. inltellnrelatiuls. and cor,iiliisiois expresc'S  in  this
P./ler  ilrc  entiwele thbose  o4  ibe  iawbors.  Thev  do  i not  lneccssarily rvpresent  the  view nf/ti  o  Vnrld R1nk,  its El.xeeltive I)irectnrs,  r1i  the'
cotinlrl  iL's the,  pseplr,seit.
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The  privatization  process  that took place  in the telecom  sector  in Senegal  in  1995-96
was the response  of the government  to the increased  competition  expected to  result from  the
development  of the  information  technology.  By anticipating  the  potential  shock  from large-
scale data processing  firms, the government sought to keep its national company alive,  with its
staff and other stake-holders.
This  process  was  triggered  by  a  report  estimating  the  gains  to  the  various  stake-
holders,  the state,  the  Sonatel company  (the  state-owned  operator),  its  staff,  and the users.  A
striking  fact  came  out  of that  study,  namely  that  80  %  of the  turnover  of the  state-owned
telecom  operator  was  made  with  local  subsidiaries  of multinational  companies,  and  was
therefore  under the potential  competition of the big international  data processors,  like SITA or
British  Telecom. Much more  than the local  firms or the household  sector, it was believed that
these customers were in a position to switch to this technology, were the telecom  sector to fail
to  deliver  the  required  telecommunication  services.  It  was  thought  that  no  acceptable
regulation could  circumvent  this potential  competition,  as  the monopoly  on data processing
would  have  to  go,  if the  pressures  on  the  government  by  the  multinational  firms  were  to
become too strong, as a response to Sonatel  failing to face up to their needs.  Moreover, as the
Senegalese  government  was  starting new programs with the  World Bank,  in the  wake of the
January  1994  devaluation  of the  CFA F,  and  in  particular a private  sector support program
presented  to  the  Board  in  February  1995,  its  position  was  not  very  strong  for  resisting
pressures in favor of liberalization.  The need was then felt to attract a strategic partner in order
to  keep  Sonatel  going,  by improving  the  management  of the  enterprise,  and by stepping  up
technical  innovation,  in  order to  keep  the  firm  abreast with  potential  competition.  Then,  a
partial privatization  of Sonatel  was effected,  with France  Telecom  taking  over  33  % of the
shares.  So  far,  Sonatel  has  kept  the monopoly  over  large-scale  data  processing.  Moreover,
some  liberalization  took place in the mobile  telephone  sector, where  two firms were allowed
to operate, one of them being a subsidiary of Sonatel.
In  addition,  the  study  also  showed  that  the  state  was  a  bad  partner,  not  only  as  a
dangerous  share-holder,  able to  siphon-off some of the cash-flow,  directly by soaking up the
3profits,  or in a more sneaky way, as a bad customer, by accumulating  arrears on its payments
due.  The government  was also in a position to use this,  and other,  state-owned  enterprises to
sidestep the credit ceilings inherent  to the participation  in the CFA Zone:  while Sonatel  was
paying immediately all its due to the state, the latter could obtain commercial credit on its own
payments to the former.  This process was creating a strain on the company's finances,  thereby
threatening its  survival, while  undermining the credibility of the government's  resolve  to get
on with  the macro-economic  adjustment program. Nowadays, the state only owns  33 % of the
shares, with no more power in  the board than the strategic partner, France Telecom.
The  present  paper  describes  the  reforms  that  took  place  in  the  telecom  sector  of
Senegal  in  two  steps.  The  first  one  was  the  1985  reform,  when  Sonatel  was  created,  a
parastatal  with monopoly right on telecommunication.  It resulted  from the restructuring of the
sector,  where  the  "Office  des  Postes  et  des  Telecommunications"  (OPT)  (Post  and
Telecommunication  Office)'  was  previously  in  charge  of both the post office  and  the  local
telephone  operation.  Another  operator  was  then  in  charge  of  international
telecommunications.  It is shown that this reform  was a relative  success,  at least on a "before-
after"  basis.  Then,  in  section  3,  it  describes  the  positions  of the  various  actors  during  the
process  that  led  to  the  privatization  of Sonatel.  It analyses  the  explicit  motivations  of the
government,  as  well  as  the  political  circumstances  that  favored  the  adoption  of  the
privatization-cum-liberalization  program.  The  subsequent  section  presents  the  privatization
process, describing how France Telecom  eventually entered the scene. Section  5 then provides
a  preliminary  assessment  of the  impact  of the  reform,  and  describes  the  new  setting  that
govems  the  functioning of the  Telecommunication  sector  in Senegal.  The events of October
2000, when the  license of one of the mobile  telephone  operators  (Sentel)  was withdrawn  are
discussed at length, as they shed some light on the uncertainty  surrounding the enforcement  of
the agreed rules of the game between  the state and the private operators.  They raise the same
conceptual  issue of the  difficult enforcement  of a contract  with a sovereign entity as did the
debt crisis of the 1980s.
42. Initial Situation and the 1985 Reform
The liberalization policy of the  1  990s had been preceded in the 1  980s by some drastic
restructuring.  The national company Sonatel  was created  in  1985,  with a view to improve the
quality of service delivered previously.  On a 'before-after'  basis, this move turned  out to be
quite  a success,  but if one  takes best-practice  technology as the counter-factual,  then Sonatel
was still lagging behind.
The State of Telecommunications  Before Sonatel
In the early  1980s, the management of telecommunications  in S6negal  was performed
by two  separate  bodies.  The Post  and  Telecommunications  Office  (OPT)  was  in  charge  of
domestic  telecommunications,  while  Telesenegal  was  in  charge  of  intemational
telecommunications.  The OPT was also running a  savings bank. The domestic network had a
very  weak infrastructure,  and  was  delivering  a very poor service.  There  were about 20 000
lines, mainly  in the Dakar  area,  amounting to about 3 lines per  1000  inhabitant.  This rate is
comparable  to  the  Sub-Saharan  African  performance  of the  time,  but  lies  well  below
intemational  standards.  The  excess  demand  pressure  was  correspondingly  strong,  as  about
50%  of the  demanders  were  not served,  with  an  average  waiting  time of four years  before
being  connected  to the network.  The  interior of the country,  and  especially  the rural  areas,
were almost  entirely  excluded  from  the  network.  While  the  whole  country  was  covered
by  22  163  lines, about two-thirds of them  (14  774)  where located  in Dakar.  Notice that, by
African standards, S6n6gal  is a highly urbanized country, with about 38 % of its population in
the urban sector in 1985 and 42 % in  1995. Chart 1 represents the percentage of each user type
in the total number of lines. Quite predictably,  the percentage  of businesses is larger  in Dakar
than in the country as a whole.
The poor quality of the  service is illustrated  by the fact that,  for example,  more  than
half of the  network  was  out  of order  during  the  whole  rainy  season.  The  percentage  of
declared breakdowns  per year reached 200 % of the lines in 1984,  a drought year, only 65 %
of them being repaired within a week.  The rate of successful  calls was very low, reaching 47
%  for  local  calls,  and  25  %  only  for inter-city  calls.  This  was  a strain  on  the  firms,  which
accounted for a large share of the clients, as seen from chart 1.
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Note: Total =  14 774 for Dakar (66  %) and 22  163  for the whole of Senegal.
The bad quality of service was not related to any staff shortage,  as the total number of
employees  was about 2000 agents, each one of them thus being on average in charge  of about
10  lines. On October  1, 1985,  the ratio of manpower to main  lines (times  1000)  was  92.3,  a
number that fell regularly ever since.
The  payment recovery  rate was  low, mainly because  the  government  and the public
sector were not paying their bills, while the accounts of the other clients were badly kept.  An
internal  Sonatel  report dated  1985,  showed that only 30  %  of the bills were  paid within the
legal  delay of 30 days,  while  55  %  were paid within  60  days.  The  level of unpaid bills was
equivalent to 7 months of total consumption  as of May 31,  1985. Half of these arrears were on
account of the  state.  The treasury's  debt to Sonatel  was CFA F 3.7  billion at that  date.  The
main  cause  of these arrears  for  the other  half was claimed  in  this report to  be the  lack of a
computerized  client  file.  For  example,  a  survey  perforrned  by an  independent  audit  firm
6showed  that  30 %  of the sums  reclaimed  from clients  had  already been paid,  while  a lot of
unpaid ones  were never reclaimed.  However,  the same report asserted that  the second cause
of the large amount of unpaid bills was "the tolerance  granted to some customers,  due in part
to their network of influence".
Moreover,  the  tariff structure  was  perceived  to  cause  distortions.  For international
calls,  it was much  cheaper  to call  Dakar  than to  call  from  Dakar,  so  that many  customers,
including  subsidiaries  of multinational  firms  were  substituting  the  former  to  the  latter.  For
example,  in May 1985, the cost per minute of a Dakar-Paris  call  was CFA F  990 versus CFA
F 828 in the other direction,  during the day, while the night tariff from Paris was CFA F  571.
The  cost of the Dakar-New  York call  was CFA F  1650, while the  call in the  other direction
was CFA F  1190. This cost difference  was not uniform,  and was in the opposite direction for
many African destinations.  For example, regarding  the calls to or from Abidjan,  the outward
call cost was CFA F 464, while the inward call cost was CFA F 535 (Babin,  1986).
The base tax was high by any  standards. It was CFA F  62  in S6n6gal,  against 38.5  in
France,  39 in Belgium,  43  in Italy, 20 in Switzerland,  and 60  in Mali,  36 in Cameroon,  50 in
Togo, 55 in Niger and 58 in C6te d'Ivoire (Babin,  1986). However,  the tariff structure did not
correspond  precisely  to  the  cost  structure,  so  that  various  implicit  cross  subsidies  were
present, generally in favor of local calls by households.  Because of the state of excess demand,
the demand  by businesses  was relatively price  inelastic,  so that the charges  for international
calls  and  inter-city  calls  had  been  set  much  above  their  cost,  the  proceeds  being  used
implicitly to subsidize  local calls by households, mainly in Dakar (Babin,  1986). However, the
response  by the  firms,  although  relatively  inelastic,  was  perceived  to  display  some  traffic
diversion, as firms were using various methods to substitute for expensive international calls.
Democratization  and the Path to Reform
The  1980s have witnessed a process of democratization  in Senegal,  after Abdou Diouf
replaced  the president  and poet  Leopold  Sedar  Senghor,  who  resigned  at the  end of  1980.
Diouf,  who  had  been  the  undisputed  Dauphin for  about  10  years  (Ka  and  Van  de  Walle,
1994), was representing  a young generation of technocrats trained in France, willing to reform
the economy  and the polity after the  crisis of the late  1970s,  when  a drought combined  with
7the  end  of the  groundnut  and  phosphates  boom  (Azam  and Chambas,  1999)  to  shock  the
economy into a  deep  crisis.  The govemment  budget deficit  reached about  9.3  % of GDP  in
1981,  while  its  twin  deficit,  the current  account,  went up to  about  20  % of GDP.  President
Diouf believed that a democratization process would help him overcome the opposition of the
old  'barons'  of the  ruling  party,  then  renamed  the  Socialist Party,  who  had  a stake  in  the
continuation  of the previous  clientelist  regime.  Nevertheless,  by African  standards,  Senegal
was already  quite  a  democratic  country,  with  four parties  allowed  to  run  for elections.  All
legal restrictions  on political parties were  removed,  and  a dozen new ones were  then created
(Ka  and  Van  de  Walle,  1994).  At  both  the  1978  and  the  1983  elections,  the  Senegalese
Democratic  Party  led by the attomey  Abdoulaye Wade  gained about a fifth of the votes.  The
Senegalese  system  is a rather presidential  one, with the president  being elected by a French-
style two-round direct election system, where  absolute majority is required to win at the  first-
round, while the parliament is composed by half of MPs elected under a proportional  system,
while the other half is elected  by a winner-take-all  system at the department  level.  Elections
take place every five years.
In  mid-1984,  the  president  announced  a new  'Medium  and  Long  Term  Adjustment
plan',  and  closed the position of the Prime  Minister,  which  was  his before  1980,  in order to
'lessen the number  of intermediaries'  (Ka  and Van de Walle,  1994, p.3 1 1).  He also  replaced
most of the old  'barons'  by younger technocrats,  thus  signaling his plan  to escape from  the
burden of the ruling party, and to base  his action  on the support of a strong civil service.  His
govemment  adopted  a  standard  adjustment  package,  including  a  stabilization  side,  and  a
structural  adjustment  side.  The  latter  included  a new  agricultural  policy,  a new  industrial
policy,  and  a trade  liberalization  package.  After  a  slow  start,  the  reform  process  took some
momentum at the turn of the decade (Rouis,  1994).  However, the public enterprise reform was
widely regarded  as the fastest on track (Ka and Van de Walle,  1994).  The restructuring of the
telecom sector took place within this framework.
8The 1985 Reform
In 1985, after consulting with the main actors of the sector, the government  decided to
merge  the  domestic  telecommunications  with  the  intemational  ones,  creating  the  national
company Sonatel,  and  to separate  it from  the  post  office.  Sonatel  is then endowed  with the
monopoly  right  over  telecommunications  in  Senegal.  A  large  autonomy  of management  is
allocated to  this new parastatal  by the government, while a list of objectives  is specified in a
"contrat-plan"  (medium-term contract),  bearing  in particular  on the extension of the network
and the  quality of the service.  More precisely,  the contract  was signed  for a period of three
years, starting on July 1, 1986. Five strategic objectives were assigned to Sonatel:
(a)  Improve  rapidly  and  durably  the  quality  of service  offered  to  the  customers  in
Dakar;
(b) achieve a set of investment projects, during the agreed period;
(c) use at best the human resources available  within the firm;
(d) give in due course an easy access to the telephone  to each Senegalese citizen;
(e) improve the brand image of Telecommunications.
The  first and  third  objectives  say  a lot  about the  political  economy  of this reform,
where  the govemment  is  trying to  strike  a  delicate balance  between  the  satisfaction  of the
urban voters,  as Dakar is the most important constituency to keep satisfied, without doing any
harm  to  the  employees  of Sonatel,  whose  political  influence  far  exceeds  their  numerical
importance,  in particular through their representative  trade union. Their political  leverage  can
be explained ti  la Olson (1965), as their small number makes them easy to organize,  while if
they go  on strike,  the resulting disruption  in telecommunication  affects  directly the resident
firms  and that  small fraction  of the population  which  is  connected  to  the network,  mainly
drawn from the richest tail of the income distribution. Article 4 of the contract, which aims at
giving  more precision  to the  stated  objectives,  makes  clear  that the  reform  has a definitely
conservative  goal.  It  says:  "While  trying  by  an  ambitious  development  program  [...]  to
respond  to the  demand for new main lines,  Sonatel  gives priority to  the improvement  of the
service  currently  offered  to users".  Article  5 hammers  the point further by emphasizing  the
need  to improve  "the quality of the service of the Dakar network  (representing  70  % of the
9clients and more than 80 % of the revenues)  ...". Among the performance  criteria assigned to
Sonatel,  article  10  specifies  that the  staff must  remain  constant,  at  2030 employees,  while
allowing  for  an increase  in the wage bill by up to  10 % per year.  Article  12  gave point (b) a
precise content.  The stated objective was to expand modestly  the number of main  lines from
21  820 on the June  30,  1985  to 27 210 on the June 30,  1989.  A quick glance  at table  1 below
shows  that  this  objective  has  been  exceeded  by  a  factor of two.  Many  other performance
criteria  were  specified,  explicitly  targeted  at  improving  the  satisfaction  of  the  initial
customers,  rather  than  at increasing  the  coverage  of the  country.  All this  reflects  the weak
political  position  of the  government  in  the  negotiation  of  this  contract  relative  to  the
politically active urban population.
Network Expansion
After ten years of operations,  the record of Sonatel  seemed quite positive. The  number
of main  lines  had  been multiplied  by 3,  from  25  000  to 75  000,  or about  13  %  per year,
reaching a density of about  9 lines per  1 000  inhabitants.  Table  1 describes  the evolution of
the  network  over the  years,  while  chart  2  depicts  the  expansion  of the  number of installed
lines per one thousand inhabitants,  showing that the number of installed lines kept well ahead
of the rapid population growth. The number of utilized main lines reached  110 000 in October
1997.  The  network  growth  was  thus  exponential  during  the  days  of the  Sonatel  public
monopoly.  The  density of telephone  lines reached  13  lines per  1000  inhabitants,  the highest
performance  in ECOWAS.  Notice  that the utilization rate, represented  in the last column of
table  1, fluctuates  roughly between  2/3 and  /4  , which  does not signal any waste,  in a rapidly
expanding network.
For the sake of comparison,  during  the same period, the extension of the network was
slower in C6te d'Ivoire,  increasing  by a factor of about 2.5, or about  10  % per year,  starting
however  from  a better  initial  situation.  The  capacity  of the  central  switchboards  was  also
increased, from 33 000 to 114 093 lines. Moreover, the relative importance of households and
businesses has been reversed, with the share of businesses accounting only for 24 %.
10Table 1: N-etwork  Expansion  (1985-1996)
Installed  Growth (%)  Used Lines  Growth  Utilization
Lines  Rate (%)
1985  33 097  0.4  22 163  5.1  67
1986  33 411  0.9  23 586  6.4  70.6
1987  34 287  2.6  26 548  12.6  77.4
1988  37 464  9.2  28 933  9  77.2
1989  64 364  71.8  36  166  25  56.2
1990  63  177  -1.8  40413  11.7  64
1991  76 972  21.8  48 469  19.9  63
1992  86 990  13  58 095  19.9  66.8
1993  91  951  5.7  64 055  10.3  69.7
1994  105  180  14.4  75 024  12.4  68.5
1995  114093  8.5  81  988  13.8  71.9
1996  133 446  17  95 063  15.9  71.2
Source: Sonatel,  28 October 1997.
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11Table 2: Main Lines per Region (31.12.1996)
Regions  Inhabitants  Urbaniza-  Number  of  Mainlines  Mainlines  Density
tion  Rate  Installed  Used  Used  (Mainlines
%  Mainlines  (Urban)  (Rural)  per 100 p.)
Dakar  2 012 303  96.6  91  214  66 084  239  3.3
Thies  1 176 654  37.3  7 691  5 974  425  0.54
Fatick  588 563  11.9  704  561  112  0.11
Kaolack  996 807  24.6  5 84  3 160  196  0.34
Ziguinchor  491  434  43.1  3 352  2 032  74  0.43
Kolda  723  594  11.8  2 088  883  114  0.14
Tambacou.  470 800  17  3 306  1 440  158  0.34
Diourbel  798 054  21.9  7 980  2 855  3 707  0.82
Louga  535 968  18.4  4 334  2 863  311  0.56
St Louis  779 051  29.6  6 903  3 639  416  0.52
Senegal  8 573  228  41.7  133 446  89 311  5 732  1.11
Source : Sonatel 28/10/1997.
The  expansion  in the  number of lines  has not taken place  evenly across the different
regions.  The density of main lines remains in  1996  much higher in Dakar than anywhere  else.
Among the other  regions,  it is noticeable  that the Diourbel region,  which contains  the city of
Touba,  the  heartland  of the Mouride  religious  brotherhood,  has a high density of telephone
lines relative  to its urbanization  rate.  This comes out clearly from table 2 . Moreover,  about
2/3  of the mainlines  used in the rural sector are located in this same region.  This reflects the
political importance of the marabouts, who play a crucial part in maintaining political stability
in  the  rural  sector,  in return  for  some patronage  from the  government  (see  Ka  and Van  de
Walle, 1994).
Figure 1: Number of Lines and Population per Regions
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Note: T.: Tombacounda, Z.: Ziguinchor.
However,  this does not mean that the Diourbel  area has been privileged  in a massive
way, as the allocation of lines across regions seems to follow a fairly simple rule, based on the
size of the population of each  region.  This comes out quite clearly from the  scatter  diagram
represented  in Figure  1. The  logarithm  of the number of mainlines  installed  is here  plotted
against the logarithm of population size  for each  region,  together with the  simple regression
line  linking  the  two.  It  seems  clear  from  this  diagram  that  population  size  is  the  main
determinant  of the allocation  of lines,  up to some  random  shock,  with an elasticity  slightly
above  2.2.  Hence,  although  Diourbel  lies  above the regression  line,  it  does not seem  to be
especially  favored  relative  to  Saint  Louis,  Louga,  or  Dakar.  The  number  of observations
available (10) precludes a more sophisticated econometric  analysis.
13Table 3 : Regional Distribution of Private Tele-Centers
Number of  Number of  %
Tele-Centers  Lines
Dakar  1527  52  2154  59
Other Regions,  1407  48  1490  41
Of which:
Thies  309  11  319  9
Saint Louis  228  8  254  7
Louga  120  4  127  3
Kaolack  166  6  176  5
Diourbel  260  9  269  7
Ziguinchor  174  6  192  5
Tamba  150  5  153  4
Total  2934  100  3644  100
Source:  Sonatel
Under  the  Sonatel  monopoly,  the number  of public  telephones  expanded,  either  as
payphones or as tele-centers.  The  former were  about 270 and generated CFA  Ill  million  of
tumover.  There  are  two  types of tele-centers,  managed  either by  Sonatel,  or  privately.  The
latter are by far the largest number, and generate  8 000 jobs.  They are using 5 601 main lines,
dealing  in  1996  with  18  % of the  total  telephone  bills,  generating  CFA  7.36 billion.  Public
telephones,  and in particular tele-centers,  are the main access  to telecommunications  by rural
people.  Table  3  shows  the  distribution  of private  tele-centers  across  regions.  Despite  the
extension  of  the  tele-centers  outside  of  Dakar,  and  in  particular  in  the  areas  of  Thies,
Diourbel, and Saint Louis, Dakar remains the main beneficiary of the tele-centers activity.
14Improved Service
The  quality of service  has improved  to some  extent  during this decade,  as the  rate of
successful  phone calls  has increased  from 47 % to 50  % for local  calls, and from 25  % to 45
%  for inter-city  calls.  However,  these  figures remain  much below the international  norms of
the ITU, which  specifies  70 % as the target for local  calls, and 60 %  for inter-city calls.  The
network  has  become  numerical  at 90  %  in  the meantime.  The  tariffs had  become  relatively
cheap by regional  standards,  and,  for example,  the price of an inter-city  call had become CFA
F 300 for three minutes in Sen6gal, and CFA F 595  in CMte  d'Ivoire.
Sonatel  also enlarged  its  scope  of activity  during  the  1985-95  decade,  by creating  a
number of new  services.  It provided  some  customers with specialized  lines,  tailored  to their
special  demands, with a guarantee  of transmission capacity and permanent access. There were
328 of these  on December  31,  1996. In September  1988, the Senpac  service was offered, for
bulk data transmission.  This network  reached  560  lines  in  1996,  with 521  customers,  377  of
them  benefiting  from  direct  access.  The  Videotex  system  was  created  in  1989,  allowing  to
access many data banks  from a Minitel,  through the Senpac  network or through a telephone
line.  Another Minitel  system,  Minitelnet,  allowed customers  to get connected  directly to the
French  Minitel  network.  A local  Internet  access  system  was  also  created  at the  end  of this
decade.  Just before privatization,  in September  1996,  Sonatel  launched  its numerical  mobile
telephone  network  Aliz6,  using  the  GSM  system.  Within  a  year,  5  500  customers  were
registered.
The Financial  Performance
The expansion  of the network,  and  the enlarged  scope  of activity,  went hand  in hand
with  an  increasing  financial  performance  of the  Sonatel  firm,  as  well  as of its  importance
within the  Senegalese  economy.  The  turnover has  trebled  over this  decade,  from  CFA  16.5
billion to more  than CFA 60 billion, while the value  added increased in the  same proportion.
Table  4  presents  the  results  for  1994-1996.  The  increase  in profit  in  the  years  preceding
privatization  is spectacular.  It seems  to be correlated  with a  fall in the number of employees
and  of employees  per  main  line,  not  offset  by  a  sizable  increase  in  personnel  cost  per
employee.  Probably,  the rise in wages  and  salaries  and the  fall  in the  number of employees
15provided  the  right  incentives  for  bringing  about  the  rise  in  productivity,  as  predicted  by
efficiency-wage  theory.  Table  5  shows  how the composition  of the workforce  was changed
during these  years,  as the ratio of management and supervisory  staff to skilled  and unskilled
workers increased.
Table 4: Financial and Economic  Results  (Current CFA Million)
1994  1995  1996  Average
Turnover  57 491  53 639  62 013  57 714
Value Added  51 714  46  553  52 872  50 380
Personnel  Cost  8 276  9 223  10 287  9 262
Before  Tax  2 149  6 543  18 315  9 002
Profit  __  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _
Personnel  1 854  1 786  1 467  1 702
Personnel  per  26  22  12  20
1000 main line
Personnel  Cost  4.46  5.16  7.01  5.54
per Employee
Note: The non-comparable  pre-devaluation data for  1987-93 are presented in the appendix.
Source:  Sonatel, 28/10/97.
As a result of this expansion,  the Sonatel firm  has become  a significant  contributor to
the country's  GDP.  Its value  added accounted for 2.5 % of GDP in  1995. Of course,  as usual
with African national accounts, the latter figure must be taken with a grain of salt, as 30 to 50
%  additional  domestic  product,  generated  in  the  informal  sector  and  in  parallel  trade,  is
probably  unrecorded  in the official  data.  Interestingly,  the number of employees  went  down
during this period. From the high of 2030 that was deemed immutable  in the  1986-89 contract,
the staff fell to an average of 1 702 over  1994-96.
16Table 5: Personnel Composition  in Sonatel
1994  1995  1996  Average
Management  306  299  290  298
Supervisors  327  321  289  312
Others  1221  1166  888  1 092
Total  1 854  1 786  1 467  1 702
(1+2)/4 (%)  34.1  34.7  39.5  36.1
Source: Sonatel, 28/10/97.
Therefore,  the  restructuring  that  occurred  in  1985  brought  about  quite  a  lot  of
improvements  in the telecom  sector of Senegal, with Sonatel  achieving a performance  record
going much  further than  the  initial requirements.  Beside  the probable  efficiency-wage  effect
mentioned  above,  it  is  plausible  that  the  presence  of representatives  from  the  consumer
association  Adeetels  on the board  of Sonatel,  together  with a free press  eager to  criticize  the
government  and  the  public  sector,  provided  the  right  incentives  for  these  performances.
However,  it is against this background of relative  success that the Senegalese  government  has
decided to go one step further in the reform process, and to launch a privatization  process by a
decision taken in the Council of Ministers  on June 25,  1995.
3. The Adoption of the 1995 Reform Package
The good performance of Sonatel relative to the pre-reform situation were not regarded
in  the  government  as -sufficient  for  facing  up  to  the  challenge  raised  by  the  fast pace  of
technological progress in the telecommunication  and information processing technology.  This
was  the main  explicit  drive behind  the reforms  launched  in the mid-1990s,  the  adoption  of
which were made easier by some political circumstances,  as well as by the wind of reform that
was  sweeping across the African continent,  and other developing  countries.  Additionally,  the
sale of public assets provided some welcome financing  for the ongoing adjustment program.
17The Government's Position
Figure 2 helps to understand  the  government's  position.  The maximum  price  that the
resident  firms  are  prepared  to  pay  for  each  level  of service  quality  (given  the volume  of
activity)  is  represented  by  the  concave  increasing  function.  The  concavity  of the  curve
captures the idea that although each  improvement in quality has some value for the firm, per
unit of activity, its incremental value goes down as quality increases, and flattens out probably
beyond  some point.  The maximum quality  that can be  found on the external market,  at each
price,  is represented  by the convex increasing curve.  The convexity of the curve describes the
fact  that  the  marginal  cost  of  improving  quality  increases  rapidly,  for  a  given  level  of
technology,  and  that  there  is  probably  an  upper  limit to the  quality of service  that can  be












Figure 2: Initial Equilibrium
The competitive  equilibrium  is  located  at point E, where these two  curves intersect.
However,  in the initial  (pre-reform)  situation,  Sonatel  had a legal monopoly,  and supplied  a
quality of service below the competitive  level. As a first approximation, it can be assumed that
18Sonatel  was  extracting  all the rent  from its customers  in the  firm  sector,  charging  them the
maximum price that they were willing to pay. Of course, not all the firms are equal, and in the
real world,  various  firms have  some bargaining power,  and manage  to get a discount relative
to this maximum.
Hence,  the vertical  distance between the two curves  at the initial quality level can be
interpreted as an implicit tax, per unit of activity.  Then, the willingness of the government  to
engage in the  reform process  can be thought about  as the response  to the fact that there is a
maximum  implicit tax that the firms  are  prepared to bear before  they engage  in lobbying  the
government  and  exert other  types  of pressure.  If there  is a  fixed  cost  to  exerting  enough
pressure  on the  government  for lifting  the monopoly right, then,  the  firms will be willing to
invest this amount of resources whenever the implicit tax goes above some threshold,  related
to the present value of the implicit tax over some future period. Given this threshold,  it is clear
from  figure 2 that the implicit tax could become too high if either the demand price by firms
went up sufficiently,  say under the pressure of globalization,  or if the supply curve shifted out
to a  large enough extent, because  of a positive technological  shock.  The third potential  cause
of increased implicit tax, namely the deterioration  of the quality of service over time, does not
seem to have been relevant in the case of S6negal under the Sonatel monopoly.
However,  the other two causes played some part in pushing the government to  engage
in the reform process,  as the latter expected both the demand  and the supply shifts  to occur in
the  near future.  The firms would additionally  find some  extemal  support  from Intemational
Financial Institutions, as the wind of reform  had reached various other countries in the African
continent,  reducing probably the fixed cost of lobbying.  Moreover, many firms in Senegal  are
French, and the French community in Dakar has always been politically influent,  and is said to
have invested a lot in funding the dominant socialist party.  Jean Collin, a Senegalese  national
of French  origin  has  always  been present  in -key positions  in  government,  especially  under
Abdou  Diouf's  presidency  (see  Ka and  Van  de  Walle,  1994).  Therefore,  the  formal  sector
firms can be expected  to have some political leverage.  In order to keep Sonatel  alive, with  its
staff and the various assets that it owned,  the government  felt the need to take  action  before
the competitors exerted too high a competitive pressure.
19Hence, there is a ceiling on the possibility of Sonatel to tax the multinational  firms and
other urban-based  businesses, imposed by potential  competition and the increasing bargaining
power  that  the  international  situation  gives  them.  As  a  result,  the  possibility  of using  the
implicit  cross-subsidy  described  above  for funding  the  extension  and  the  operation of the
telephone network in the rural sector is limited, and some other source of funds is needed.
Moreover,  the  sale  of government  assets played  a particular  role  in  the Senegalese
structural  adjustment program.  The Senegalese  govemment  owned  a relatively  large portfolio
of productive  assets,  because  of the  policy  of Senegalization  that  had been pursued  in the
wake of the commodity boom of the late  1970s (Azam  and Chambas,  1999). Then, the world
price of groundnuts  and phosphates had increased abruptly,  for a short-lived boom. Like many
other African  states, the  Senegalese  govemment had  taxed most of the boom away from the
producers,  and used the proceeds  to pursue its own agenda (see Collier, Gunning at al.,  1999,
for a series of case  studies). Unlike some other African countries,  Senegal did not use all this
money to increase massively public sector wages  and salaries,  or to engage in some other kind
of politically irreversible increases in expenditures.  Recognizing the expected transitory nature
of the boom, the govemment rightly chose  to invest a significant part of the windfall (Azam
and  Chambas,  1999).  However,  it  did  not  choose  any  intemational  liquid  assets,  or  any
completely  illiquid  public  infrastructure,  at  least  not  massively,  and  opted  instead  for  an
extension  of its public  enterprise  sector,  effected  in  large  part by a process  of purchasing
foreign  firms,  within  a  program  of  "Senegalization"  of  the  economy.  This  made  the
subsequent recovery  from  the groundnuts  and phosphate boom quite difficult,  as productivity
went down in most of these (<  Senegalized >>  firms, but had some longer-run financial benefits.
This  relatively  large  portfolio  of productive  assets  gave  the  Senegalese  government  some
room for maneuver when the time came of adjusting its economy and stabilizing it, enabling it
to finance some of its reforms out of the sale of some of these assets. After a slow start, during
the 1980s,  Senegal got actively involved in the adjustment program in the early  1990s (Rouis,
1994),  and  used  the  sale  of its  productive  assets  as  a means  to  finance  some  public  debt
reduction,  mainly  after  1989  (Azam,  1997,  Ka and Van  de  Walle,  1994).  This provided  an
additional  incentive to the government for privatizing the telecom sector.
20The Other Players
The  need to  expand  the  coverage  of the  rural  sector  raises  another  problem  for the
government,  as  the  marabouts,  i.e.  the  religious  authorities  from  the  three  brotherhoods
present in Senegal, do control the votes of the peasantry, and are pushing for a rapid extension
of the  telephone  network  in the rural  areas.  Ka and  Van  de Walle  (1994)  describe  in some
detail  the  roots  of the  marabouts'  political  power,  and  their  connections  with  the  dominant
party system. Both presidents Senghor and Diouf have kept good relations with the marabouts,
using them as a handle  for social  control, through the close links that they represent between
the peasants and the rural elite,  in return for public  investment  in strategic rural development
projects, as well as the opening of various positions in the civil service and the public sector to
some  of the  marabouts'  followers.  The  government  had gradually learnt the  cost of keeping
the marabouts  satisfied.  In the  late  1970s,  the  financial  disaster of Oncad,  the parastatal  in
charge of the commercialization  of agricultural products,  among other things, epitomized  the
deleterious  role  of over-manning  of administrative  bodies  within  the  political  patronage
system then in operation (Azam and Chambas,  1999). This disaster,  in which the government
had to take over a debt of CFA F  90 billions in 1982,  after a protracted battle for dismantling
this parastatal, had left painful memories  to the leading politicians. After the democratization
of the  political  system  that took place  in  1976,  the political  influence  of the  brotherhoods
increased, because of their control over a large share of rural votes. They are widely regarded,
especially  the  most numerous  Mourides,  as playing  a  detenninant  part  in the  outcomes  of
national  elections,  both presidential  and  legislative.  Ka  and  Van  de  Walle  (1994)  provide
examples of their involvement in the electoral battles, which illustrate their political power.
In  this  particular  instance,  the  trade-off  faced  by  the  government  was  between
extending the network  in the rural  sector, in order  to please  the marabouts,  especially in the
groundnut growing area where  they flourish,  versus keeping the control  of a parastatal,  with
its reserve of jobs and privileges to be allocated to patron-client politics, but subject to various
competitive constraints bearing on its expansion, as seen above.
Moreover,  under the pressure of various  vocal urban groups, the government made in
1993-94 an opening in the direction of the opposition parties.  The charismatic  liberal (pro-free
21market)  leader  Abdoulaye  Wade,  who  was  to become  president  in  March  2000,  was  then
invited  to  join  the  govemment  in  February  1995,  as Minister  of State,  where  he  stayed  in
office  up  to  1997.  Beck  (1999)  provides  an  interesting  discussion  of  the  <<  enlarged
presidential  majority >>,  that ruled  the  country over that period,  arguing  that its main impact
was to divide the opposition,  while attracting two out of the twelve or so opposition parties in
government,  by  giving  them  access  to  political  resources  for  enhancing  their  ability  to
distribute patronage.  President Diouf was thus  aiming at calming down  some relatively pro-
active opposition groups, including the students and some trade unions opposed to the policies
pursued by the dominant socialist party, in power since independence.  Wade's presence in the
government was widely perceived  as a means to secure some transparency and accountability
for the government's  policy, and thus as a protection  against the corruption that voters were
denouncing.  This move reduced significantly the political weight of the accusation of selling
off the  state's  assets  at  a cut price,  which  was  the  mainstay of the  dominant  trade  unions
position  on  privatization.  Hence,  the  trade  unions  coalition  inside  Sonatel,  which  was
resolutely opposed to privatization,  lost part of its bargaining power at that time.
The  Sonatel  inter-union official position  was mainly based  on their opposition to the
privatization  of a  highly  profitable  firm,  with  high  technical  performance,  the  best  one  in
Ecowas,  and their  fears  that the  privatized  firm  would  not comply  with  its public  service
obligations,  including  the delivery of telecom services to the non profitable  rural areas, and
would cut the number of jobs.  However, they had lost the battle against the previous reform,
mainly  in  1983,  and had kept vivid  memories  of the political  cost of this defeat.  Therefore,
beside  their  traditional  facade  of resistance  against  privatization,  the  unions  were  in  fact
preparing  a  much  more  realistic  line  of defense,  trying  to  get  from  the  government  the
guarantee that:  (i)  they would  be involved in the discussions about the privatization  process,
(ii)  the  current level of employment  would be preserved,  and,  (iii) they would  get a  share  of
the capital. In fact, they launched several strikes for securing these three points.
They were joined by the customer's associations,  which had  been represented in the
board of administrators  of Sonatel ever since the 1985 reform.  Adeetels, which represents  the
consumers  in  the  sector  of  public  utilities,  is  a  subsidiary  of  the  intemational  network
22Consumers  International,  whose  regional  office  for Africa  is  located  in  Dakar.  The  other
consumers  association,  Ascosen,  is  a  general-purpose  association.  The  consumer's
representatives  were expecting  that privatization would deprive them of their representation  at
this level,  as  shareholders  only  could be represented  after that  change.  They were  afraid  of
moving  from a public monopoly to a private one,  on the grounds that the latter would be even
less responsive to consumers'  pressures.
An  important  supporter  of  the  privatization  process  was  the  GRCC  (Groupe  de
reflexion  sur  la  comp6titivite  et  la  croissance).  This  state-financed  reflection  group  was
working  with independent experts, and used to invite many representatives  of the civil society
to participate in its debates. They held two seminars on the reform of the telecom sector where
the  decisions  to  privatize  and  to  liberalize  were  discussed.  Representatives  of  the
Entrepreneurs'  union and of different  workers  unions, of the Ministry of Finance,  as well  as
journalists  and  experts,  were  invited.  Whereas  the  first  of these  seminars  turned  sour,  the
conclusions  of  the  second  one  were  very  much  in  favor  of  the  privatization  and  the
liberalization  of the sector (GRCC,  1995).  This reflected  the progress being  achieved  by the
idea of privatization among the elite.
4. The Privatization and Liberalization Process
On February,  22,  1995,  the National  Assembly has voted  the law that laid the  ground
for the  privatization  process.  The  monopoly  right is  taken  away  from  Sonatel,  and a broad
framework  is  chosen  for  organizing  competition  in the  sector.  The  act  distinguishes  three
levels of operations:  (i) in the so-called "value added sector", more or less free competition is
allowed;  (ii)  in the cellular phone sector, the plan is  to have "organized  competition",  while
(iii) the monopoly  is kept  for the  fixed  lines operations,  although  there  was  a  debate  about
whether  the  entry  of a second  operator  would  improve  the  performances  of the  sector.  An
internal  document  called  "declaration  de  politique  de  developpement  des
t6lecommunications"  is then circulated,  which announces that within a four year  horizon, the
rural communities  would be connected  to the  network,  Sonatel  would be privatized,  and the
cellular phone market would be liberalized. The call for tender is published in  1996.
23The Privatization of  Sonatel
The  privatization  process  was  overseen  by a  special  committee,  the "Commission  de
Pilotage  de la Privatisation  de Sonatel",  with representatives  from the Ministries  of Defense,
Home Affairs, and Finances,  from the Prime Minister and the Presidency,  as well as from the
Sonatel  company  itself.  The  National  Assembly voted the Privatization  Act,  and the process
had to take place in three steps:
(i) sale of the strategic bloc (33.33  %);
(ii) sale of the  shares to the employees  (10 %);
(iii) public sale of the remaining shares (17.66 %).
The Senegalese  government  was to keep 34 %,  while the remaining shares (5%) were
kept for an African operator to be deternined2.
A French Bank,  the CCF (Credit Commercial  de France)  was in charge of evaluating
the offers for the strategic bloc. Its contract  involved a fixed fee augmented by a percentage of
the sale value.
Two  companies  were  bidding,  France Telecom,  on  the one hand,  and  a consortium
dominated by  the Swedish  firm  Telia,  and  including  a Senegalese  businessman  operating  in
Britain.  It seems that the government  was seriously willing to avoid France Telecom,  in order
to avoid extending the influence of the former colonial power.
At  first,  the  Scandinavian  company  Telia  won  the auction,  for the  Consortium.  It
acquired  the monopoly right up to the  year 2003, with the objective of having 400 000 main
lines by that time. Then, competition  was supposed to be opened.  However,  this consortium
ran short of capital,  and failed  eventually to mobilize CFA 70 billion that it was  supposed to
get from the credit market.  Moreover,  it wanted  a short concession (seven years),  with  a view
to  be  able  to  pull  out  easily,  while  the  Senegalese  government  wanted  a  longer  term
commitment  (20 years),  in order to provide  better incentives  for fixed  capital investment,  as
the latter was making the extension of the network in the rural sector a priority.
Eventually,  France Telecom won the bid, and got essentially the same agreement as the
Telia-led  consortium,  the  so-called  "7  accords".  The  main  difference  was  that the business
plan was running up to 2005.
24Neither  the government,  nor the  strategic  partner (France  Telecom)  does control  the
administrative  board  of  Sonatel.  The  new  board  is  comprised  of  four  administrators
representing  the state, including one from the military,  four also for France Telecom, while the
last member represents the insiders'  labor union,  for reasons presented below.  Therefore,  any
strategic  decision  has  to  be  based  on  a  consensus  between  the  government  and  France
Telecom. Nowadays,  France Telecom has in fact acquired  9 % more shares.
Moreover,  France Telecom  gets a management  fee  for running Sonatel.  It is based on
the  growth  of operating profits  which,  in view  of the  price stability  prevailing  in the  CFA
zone, provides an incentive to expand the network in profitable areas.
The trade unions inside Sonatel fought hard to get their share of the pie. Initially,  they
demanded  25 %,  and the possibility for them and other nationals  to buy the shares at a  10 %
discount, as well  as some credit for them to buy their reserved shares,  plus a  series of minor
demands,  like  a  national  debate  for  selecting  the  strategic  partner.  The  first  offer  by  the
government was three percent of the shares, and a  series of strikes resulted. At the end of the
latter,  the president chose to  give them  10  %, with  a 45  %  discount.  Moreover,  these shares
were not salable for three years, while  the unions  wanted a period of non tradability of five
years. As the shares were sold CFA F 19  500 to the employees, the unions had to find CFA F
19.5  billion to pay off the state. The implicit 'present',  entailed by the 45  % discount is thus
about  CFA  F  16  billion.  They  collected  one  billion,  and  organized  a  company,  the  STE
(Senegalaise  des Telcommunications)  for managing the employee's savings.  Moreover, they
used  their  accumulated  retirement  funds  (about  CFA  F  2.5  billion).  The remaining  sixteen
billions  were  to  be  advanced  by the  state at  zero  interest  rate,  to be  reimbursed  from the
dividends.  In  fact,  the  employees  obtained  the  zero  rate  of  interest  after  a  strike.  The
distribution  of the  shares  among  the  employees  was  based  on the  cash  invested,  on  the
retirement provision engaged,  and then, on the  state loan, with a positive correlation with the
amounts willingly invested.  Some  employees  did not get any  shares, as they did not wish to
invest in Sonatel, but some provision were made for reserving shares for future recruits.
The main benefit of this grouped  10 %  shares  in the STE was the possibility of getting
a  representative  in  the  administration  board.  In  order  to  keep  this  advantage,  the  STE
25organized  a system  for buying internally the shares of the employees  who wanted to sell them.
On the other hand, the  dividends turned  out at times not to be sufficient  for reimbursing the
state loan,  so  that the  employees  had  to save out of their salaries  and bonuses.  However,  the
unions  are  not  represented  in  the  board  of Alizee,  the  Sonatel-subsidiary  cellular  phone
operator,  on the grounds  that Sonatel as  a whole is represented.  Some union action is planned
on this  point.  The  unions  have  also  created  a  link  with  the consumer  association  that was
previously  represented  on  the  board,  inviting  them  at  their  meetings  in  order  to keep  the
relevant  information  flowing,  and  to  get  their  support  when  needed,  e.g.  when  they go on
strike.
Moreover,  the privatization  program  involved some downsizing.  Initially,  this was to
be limited to voluntary quits. However, this turned out to fall short of the requirement,  and the
management provided some additional pecuniary incentives  to quit, and a total of 480 people
accepted to go, many of them from the declining departments,  like the telegraph.  The unions
had prepared  a  set of accompanying  measures,  like the creation  of small businesses  for sub-
contracting  with  Sonatel,  some  re-training  activity,  etc.  But  only  40  employees  took some
training  before  leaving  the  firm.  Probably,  the  absence  of industrial  action  against  the
downsizing is a favorable by-product of the workers acquisition of a share of their firm, giving
them a stake in improved productivity.
The Liberalization of  the Cellular  Phone Sector
While the Ministry of finance was overseeing the privatization  process, the Ministry of
Commerce  was  in  charge  of the liberalization  process  for the  cellular phone  sector.  Sonatel
had  created  its  cellular  department  called  Alizee,  just  before  being privatized.  The  call  for
offers  was  published  very  fast,  and  eight  candidates  put  up  a  proposal  (Comsat,  CAT,
Vodacom,  International  Wireless,  Telecel, ATM,  ...). It was not an auction,  as the price of the
license had been fixed, based on the case  of C6te d'Ivoire and a study mission in Canada, and
the choice between applicants was to be made  on a score  list. The application file contained  a
task list (cahier des charges),  an evaluation  form,  a bank guarantee  for FF  100 millions, plus
FF  500  000  for  the  task  list.  Two  non  credible  candidates  dropped  at  that  point.  The
competition  was run in a transparent  way,  under the  special  attention of the presidency.  This
26was due both to the fear that the press would  again denounce  corruption, and to the pressure
by the US  embassy to avoid that a <<  present >>  be made to the French.  Sentel, a subsidiary of
the  US  company  Millicom  Intemational  (whose  headquarters  are  in  fact  located  in
Luxembourg),  won  the  competition  for  the  second  license,  but  took  a  year  to  start  its
operations, after buying  its license,  for lack of initial capital.  In the meantime,  a boom on the
cellular phone occurred,  such that about  50 000 users were registered by 1999. The opening of
a third license, while being mentioned,  was not precisely on the agenda at the end 2000.
Although  some  precise  engagement  was  required  from  the  bidders,  with  penalties
explicitly  planned  for  any  deviations  from  the  concession  contract,  some  fuzzy  points
remained,  and  needed  to  be  corrected  later.  For  example,  the  important  issue  of
interconnection  tariffs was not part of the initial agreement, but came later, two years after the
privatization.  The discussion  involved  Sonatel,  Sentel, and the ministry. This illustrates  that
there seem to exist some re-negotiation  clauses  in the concession contract.  Similarly, it took
some faith on the part of Sentel to expect that no cross-subsidies  would be given by Sonatel to
provide  a  competitive  edge  to  its cellular  subsidiary,  Alizee.  In  fact,  the  legal  framework
governing the relationships  between  Sonatel and its cellular phone subsidiary Alizee has  only
been effective  on October  1, 1999.  The regulatory  framework for controlling  the sector has
thus remained in a state of flux for awhile.
The Regulation of the Sector
While the  creation of the Telecom  Regulation  Authority, called  the ART (Agence  de
r6gulation des telecoms)  has been on the agenda for a long time, the Ministry of Commerce is
the acting regulator,  as the legal creation of the ART, although ready on paper to be presented
to parliament, has been resisted by a powerful interest group. It was expected that ART would
become opetational  during the first term of the year 2000, but this  has been postponed.  The
Ministry  of  Commerce,  through  its  recently  created  'direction  des  etudes  et  de  la
reglementation  des postes  et des telecommunications'  (ERPT),  is thus  in charge  during  the
initial  period of overseeing the compliance  with the concession contract,  and has to  face the
unplanned  issues. For example,  it had to manage  the debate over interconnection  tariff, where
the demands  by Sentel were  regarded as too high,  and the Ministry of Commerce  eventually
27sided  with  Sonatel,  which  provided  some  estimates  of the true  cost.  These  inter-connection
agreements  are  meant  to  be  revised  every  two  or three  years.  Table  A.3  in  the appendix
presents the current level of interconnection  charges.  Moreover,  this direction of the Ministry
has  very  few  technical  means  of its  own,  so  that  it  sub-contracts  most  of its  controls  to
technicians  from Sonatel.  Sentel has  to get prior approval  for some  of its investments.  There
are  complaints  by Sentel  that  this  is  a  source  of inside  information  leaking  to  Alizee,  the
mobile-phone  subsidiary of Sonatel, which has been able on some occasion  to anticipate  some
strategic  decisions of Sentel's,  regarding  in particular the  location of some  transmitters.  This
Ministry will remain in charge of presenting to the government any legal text proposed by the
ART,  if and  when  it is  created,  through  a new direction,  replacing  the direction  ERPT.  This
replacement is still to come.
The  ART  is  planned  to  generate  its  own resources.  The  payment  for  the  agreement
with Sonatel,  for the licenses,  and various  levies on licenses,  on frequencies,  etc.  are paid  in a
special account at Sonatel.  Moreover,  it is to be funded by a 2 % turnover tax, the proceeds of
which are to be directly paid in the ART special account, when the latter is operational.  Part of
this  tax  is  also  intended  for  funding  research.  The  surpluses  of the ART  should  be used  as
additional  funding  for  the  expansion  of the  network  and  the  pursuit  of the  objective  of
universal service.
In the current version of the project,  the regulatory authority is planned to be based  on
a college  of three regulators,  comprised  of technical  experts  and judges.  The  former  are to be
selected  among  former  Sonatel  employees  by  the  president,  among  those  proposed  by  the
Minister  and  the  members  of the  economic  and  social  council.  The  collegial  nature  of the
ART  is meant  to  minimize  the  risk of capture,  while the fact  that  all its members  are  civil
servants is claimed to offer an additional  guarantee of 'moral probity'.  The members are  to be
in  place  for  three  or  six  years,  renewable  in  turn,  and  cannot  be  dismissed.  In  case  of
disagreement,  the  Minister  has  no power of last resort  arbitration.  In  fact,  the  International
Chamber of Commerce of Paris  is the ultimate authority in such a case.  The secretariat of the
ART  is  to  be  provided  by  a  Director  General,  and  an administration  board  to  oversee  its
operations.  There is no representative  of the consumers associations.  However, this regulatory
28framework  is  still  waiting  to be  voted.  During  the winter of 2001,  a competing project has
been  devised,  aiming  at  creating  a  multi-regulation  agency,  which  would  regulate  all  the
public utilities.
As of October 2000, there were  two licenses  for the cellular phone,  three licenses  for
paging, three also for trucking, about ten for the Vsat network  (data processing:  World Bank
resident mission, BCEAO, etc.),... While the monopoly has been kept over the access node for
the Internet, the Internet  service is entirely liberalized; The fixed lines, and the wireless local
loop are under the Sonatel monopoly until 2003.
The tariff policy is based on price caps, but of a very  flexible  kind, in  order to allow
for revisions.  The initial caps have been discussed with the operators.  For example,  the price
cap on the base tax is CFA F 80  for local  calls, while the  actual price is CFA F 50. In other
words, the cap is not binding, so that the tariffs are basically unregulated.  However,  there is a
clear policy of lowering progressively  the charges on international  calls, with  a view to align
gradually the tariffs on the costs.  The proclaimed policy is that this gradual move is required
before  opening  entirely  the  network  to  competition.  As  shown  below,  this  price  cut  was
effected after privatization.
5. A Preliminary Assessment
The impact of the privatization of Sonatel  seems to be positive,  as predicted,  in view
of the  first three years of operation.  However,  the  results of the liberalization  process  in the
mobile  phone  sector  seems  more  difficult  to  assess,  and  raise  interesting  issues,  that  are
discussed in a second point.
The Results of  Privatized Sonatel
Table 6 provides the major financial indicators describing  the activity of the privatized
Sonatel  company.  There  is  a marked  improvement  over the  1994-96  average  performance
presented  in the  first column,  as  far as  tumover  and value-added  are  concemed,  while this
firm  has  spent  more  on  factors  of production,  increasing  both  its personnel  cost  and  its
investment  outlays.  While  tumover  has  nearly  doubled  in  1999,  relative  to  the  1994-96
average,  value added has increased by more than 50 %. This marginal  squeeze  in value added
29reflects  probably  to  some  extent  the increased  relative  price  of imported  inputs  due  to  the
1994  devaluation  of  the  CFA  franc.  In  the  meantime,  the  investment  effort  has  been
multiplied almost by a factor of 4. At the end of 1999,  the Sonatel shares accounted for about
25 % of the capitalized quotation in the regional stock exchange of Abidjan.
Table 6 :Financial Performance of Privatized Son atel9799
1994-96 Average  1997  1998  1999
Turnover  57.7  80.1  90.7  103.5
Value Added  50.4  57.1  74.0  79.7
Personnel Cost  9.3  9.8  11.6  13.0
Investment  16.9  21.3  40.0  54.6
Source:  Sonatel 2000
Table 7: Quantitative Performance  Indicators of Privatized Sonatel  (1997-99)
1994-96 Average  1997  1998  1999
Main Lines Used  84 025  115 902  139 549  165  874
Alizee Subscript.  _  7 000  22  110  73 472
International:  In  68.9  94.0  111.0
(million min.) Out  _  27.6  31.7  36.5
Personnel  1 702  1 346  1 070  1 052
Productivity  49.4  86.1  130.4  157.7
Source: Sonatel 2000.
Table  7 provides  some quantitative  performance  indicators,  describing  the  expansion
of the scale and  efficiency of operation of Sonatel.  The number of main lines used has almost
doubled in 1999  relative to the  1994-96 average, while the number of employees  has been cut
by more than a third, entailing a near trebling of productivity.  Moreover,  the expansion  of the
use of international  phone calls  is measured in lines  3 and 4,  in terms of million of minutes,
showing a faster increase in the number of calls from abroad than from the country.
30In the  meantime,  Sonatel  has  cut  its  prices,  and  improved  the  quality  of service.
Connection charges have been cut by 50% in July 1998, from 87 700 CFA F to 43 900 CFA F
for  an ordinary  line.  By enlarging  the  definition  of local  communication  zones,  it has also
reduced the cost of a call between two departments  of the same region from 60 CFA F for 45
seconds  to  60  CFA  F  for  2  minutes,  on  the  same  date.  The  minute  of  inter-regional
communication  has  fallen  from  80  CFA F to  30  CFA  F,  a fall by 63  %.  International  calls
have been reduced on several occasions: a cut of 10 % in February  1998,  15.5 % in December
1998,  10 %  again in July 1999, and 8 % on January  15,  2000. Therefore, it seems that Sonatel
has now reached a fairly elastic part of  its demand curve, and must cut its prices for expanding
the  size  of its  operations.  On  June  6, 2000,  a  further  series  of cuts  was  made  regarding
international  calls,  including  the creation  of a reduced  charge  for night calls  and  during the
week end. This resulted in a fall by 25 % of the normal tariff, and a cut by 50 % for the night
and week end calls.  The  resulting  charges  are much below those of other  African countries,
For example,  the  cost of calling  Senegal  from  Mali and Cote d'Ivoire were  respectively  700
CFA F and  535 CFA F per minute, while the price for a call in the reverse  direction was only
283 CFA F in normal time, and  170 CFA F at the reduced tariff (all these are before tax). The
cost of calling France  from  S6negal  was then  less than half the cost of calling France  from
C6te d'Ivoire (425 versus  900 CFA F); the cost of calling the USA was three times lower (442
versus 1400 CFA F).
Moreover, the commercial policy of Sonatel was not only based on cut prices, but also
on  improved  quality  of service.  For example the fraction  of faults repaired  within two  days
reached  89.88  %  in  1999,  and  the fraction  repaired  within eight  days reached  99.73  %  the
same year.  The rate of successful  calls was  32.7 %  for international  calls,  and 64.79  %  for
local calls.
However,  this expansion  in the size of operation was achieved without any significant
gain in total  factor productivity,  when the latter is measured  in terms of constant  price value
added, rather than by the number of lines per employee, as done above at table 7. This comes
out clearly from the following exercise.
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Chart  3  presents  both the  logarithm  of the  real  tumover  per worker  and  real  value
added  per  worker,  both  computed  by  using  the  GDP  deflator,  over  the  period  1987-1999.
Their growth  is impressive over the whole period. There seems to be a downward shift in both
series  in  1994,  suggesting  that the  impact of the  1994  devaluation  of the  CFA franc on the
price level was not passed on proportionately by Sonatel to its customers. Then, from  1995 up
to  1998,  both  series  show  a  steeper  trend,  suggesting  that  privatization  boosted  labor
productivity,  while this acceleration  effect seems to stop in  1999, the growth rate going back
to  its  previous  level.  However,  this  latter point needs  to  be confirmed  in the years to  come.
Chart 4  suggests  that this gain in labor productivity  over the previous trend was obtained by
substituting  used  lines  for  workers.  It  shows  that  the  expansion  in  the  number of lines per
worker was stepped up after privatization,  while  the downward trend in value added per line
became somewhat steeper.  Therefore,  it seems that France Telecom has pushed the privatized
Sonatel  to  adopting  a  more  capital-intensive  technique  of production,  probably  because  it
provided a better access to the capital market than the state-owned Sonatel ever had.
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Using these  data,  and  regarding  the number of lines  as  a rough proxy for the capital
stock, one can estimate a simple Cobb-Douglas production function, by ordinary least squares,
keeping  in  mind  that  the  small  number  of observations  imposes  to be  extremely  cautious
about the results. In log-linear form, the estimates are3:
iog[Real Value Added]  = - 12.83  + 0.50 log[Personnel]  + 0.71  log[Lines],
(6.08)  (2.72)  (9.69)
N= 13, J2 = 0.96, D.W. = 2.23, F(3,  10) = 113.89, Chow-F(4, 9) =  1.62.
The  number  of observations  is  noted N,  and  is  admittedly  rather  small.  The  fit  is
apparently  very good, as usual  with Cobb-Douglas  functions.  There is no significant  residual
autocorrelation,  according to the Durbin-Watson statistics.  The Chow  test addresses the issue
of coefficients  stability, before and after 1996,  and suggests that there is no significant shift in
the production  function  in 1996,  implying  that the main impact of privatization  has been the
change  in  capital  intensity brought  out  above,  rather than  any  significant  gain  in technical
efficiency.  The  t-statistics  reproduced  in  parentheses  below  the  estimated  coefficients  are
33White's heteroscedasticity-consistent  ones, and suggest that all the estimates have a pretty low
standard error.  Lastly, as expected for a network  industry, we find that the returns  to scale are
increasing,  as  the  sum  of the  coefficients  of labor  and  number  of lines  adds  up  to  1.21.
Moreover,  the number  of lines  is  an  imperfect  proxy for the  capital  stock,  and  the  implied
measurement  error  should  bias  the  estimated  coefficient  downwards.  However,  one should
keep  in  mind  that  the  sample  size  is  very  small,  so  that  the  results  must  be  regarded  as
suggestive,  rather than firmly established. Nevertheless,  they suggest that the main impact of
the privatization process was the adoption of a more capital-intensive  technique of  production,
with  an  accelerated  expansion  of  the  network  combined  with  a  cut  in  manpower.  No
significant  gain in total factor productivity  seems to have occurred,  besides the economies of
scale.  This  is  confirmed  by the  following  alternative  test,  where  D96 is  a dummy variable
taking the value  1 from  1996 on, aiming at capturing the impact of privatization4:
log[Real  Value Added] = - 10.82  + 0.24 log[Personnel]  + 0.71  log[Lines]  - 0.13 D96,
(6.08)  (0.83)  (8.37)  (1.16)
N= 13, R2 = 0.96, D.W.  = 2.77, F(4, 9) = 79.01.
The  dummy variable  D96 has a negative  impact, but is not significant.  Its  inclusion
affects  significantly  the estimated  coefficient  of  log[Personnel],  suggesting  that  these two
series  are  negatively  correlated  over  this  sample.  Hence,  this  equation  provides  some
additional support to the diagnosis expressed  above.
Nevertheless,  the newly elected government decided in October 2000 to revise the task
list of Sonatel,  without  negotiation,  in order  to step  up the expansion  of the network  in the
rural  sector  (Dieng,  2000).  The  government  has  replaced  the objective  of connecting  1000
additional  villages  by the  end  of 2002,  by  the  target  of 7000  villages  by the end  of 2005.
According to  Samba  Sene,  Sonatel's Network Director,  this could by no means be achieved
even in  a  decade (interview  to Le Journal de L'Economie, N° 236, October  23,  2000). With
the current  fixed line  technology,  Sonatel claims to be able to connect  about  100 villages per
year,  and  650  villages  are  connected  at the  end of the  year 2000.  The  emerging  agreement
between the government and Sonatel  seems to be (as of end 2000) to open that segment of the
34market to private operators  (Globalstar  and others), who would invest using the new wireless
technology.  However,  this  attempt  by  the  government  at  renegotiating  the  privatization
contract by imposing new objectives seems mild relative to the action taken against Sentel.
The Sentel Shock
The most important event  that  took place  in the aftermath of this privatization-cum-
liberalization  episode  was  the  withdrawal  of the  license  of  operation  of  Sentel  by  the
government  in  October  2000,  a  license  that  had  been  granted  only  on July  3,  1998.  This
occurred  in the  wake of 'Sopi',  meaning  'the  change'  in the Wolof language,  a word which
has become a symbol all over Francophone  West Africa.
In  March  2000  the  socialist  government  which  ruled  the  country  ever  since
independence  was  unexpectedly  defeated  in  the  general  elections,  and  Abdoulaye  Wade
became the  new president.  The  defeat  was  a  surprise  to  many observers,  because it  showed
that the elections  were not as rigged and manipulated  as many believed, and the  Senegalese
people  are  rightly proud of it. In  fact, in the post-election period,  presidents  Wade and  Diouf
made several gestures to show  that the change was effected in a perfectly democratic climate,
with Abdou Diouf being invited by president Wade to represent  Senegal  at the OAU summit,
for example.  The  main argument that seems to have won  the voters preferences  was the fight
against  corruption.  Diouf's  last Foreign Minister,  Moustapha  Niasse,  together  with  some of
his followers,  left the ruling socialist party,  and founded  the 'Alliance  des forces  de progres'.
Their political  line  is  to be the  'anti-corruption  socialists'.  Between  the two rounds  of the
election,  they reached  an agreement with the pro-market  'parti  democratique  senegalais',  the
party of the historic opponent, and main pro-market politician, Abdoulaye Wade.
After  'Sopi', as  Wade became  president,  many  socialists  started  to quit  the  defeated
socialist party, nicknamed  the 'transhumants',  to join either Niasse's  forces, or the president's
party.  President Wade soon realized that the image of the newly elected coalition  was rapidly
changing  in the  public  sentiment,  partly  in  favor  of the  prime  Minister's  party,  but  also
negatively,  a bit  like 'old  crooks wearing  new  clothes',  as  many politicians  of the previous
regime reappeared  in prominent positions in the new coalition.  He thus  felt under pressure  to
take a major  initiative on the anti-corruption  front, the wining  theme of the  elections.  As the
35privatization  process  had  attracted  a  lot  of  attention  during  the  electoral  campaign,  the
previous govermnent  being widely  accused of selling off the  'country's  assets'  at  a bargain
price,  it  naturally  provided  a  privileged  battle  field  for  a  major  political  move.  The  first
'victim'  was the Senelec company,  the power company that was privatized  in 1998.  The Elyo
company,  a subsidiary of the French Company Lyonnaise  des Eaux,  had bought jointly with
the Canadian  company Hydro  Quebec  International,  35  % of its capital.  Its license has been
withdrawn  at  the  beginning  of October  2000.  The  main  accusation  by  the  Senegalese
government  was that  it had failed  to  even  spend the  first  franc  on the promised  investment
program.
Another private  firm, in the chemical  sector has also been under attack, the  'Industries
Chimiques  du Senegal',  a multinational  firm, with mainly Indian  and Senegalese  capital. The
government has attempted  to remove the General Director of this firm, Pierre  Babacar Kama,
a move  that lies beyond  its legal power.  This is regarded as a personal  affair of the president.
The  Indian  investor  resisted  this  government  intervention,  and  seems  so  far  to  have  been
vindicated.
Then  came  the  turn of Sentel.  This  decision was  announced  on October  12,  2000  by
the  Council  of Ministers,  while  the Minister  Mamadou  Diop  Decroix  was  away  (Le Sud,
October 12),  and his cabinet seemed unable or unwilling to explain this decision to the media.
The  general  director  of  Sentel,  Youval  Rosh  was  also  away,  attending  the  Millicom
International  annual conference of its mobile phone operators in St Petersburg, which was also
attended by  the president  of the  Sentel board  of administrators,  Pape  Abdoul  Ba.  On many
occasions before this, the President had complained that the price paid by Sentel to acquire the
license, CFA francs 50 million, was very low compared to some other countries,  as well as the
annual  payment  of CFA  franc  50  million.  He  mentioned  the  case  of Morocco,  where  the
cheapest  license  had  been auctioned  off for CFA  francs  1.5 billion,  on October  9,  during  a
meeting  with  representatives  from  the  'Front  de  l'Alternance',  the  organization  which  had
been  active  in  consolidating  the  wining  coalition.  Then,  he  complained  about  this,  and
mentioned the conditions in which the series of privatization in general took place in Senegal,
and was very vague about the Sentel license,  when asked about  it. At the end of the meeting,
36he said:  'it's over, we are going to withdraw'.  One of his close advisors added:  'he is going
to do it, even if there are penalties'  (Le Sud, October  12). The decisive benchmark  case seems
to have been that of the mixed private  Mauritanian  and  Tunisian  society Mattel which paid
more than  CFA francs  19  billion (US  $ 28.5  million) for  its license,  and then invested  more
than CFA  francs  35  billion,  while  Sentel's  investments  have been  difficult  to know at that
point,  but are  now claimed  to be one year ahead of schedule,  an easily verifiable  claim.  The
case of Sentel was made  difficult by the fact that  no part of the contract  signed between  the
government and Sentel has been circulated,  even on a restricted basis, which aroused  a climate
of suspicion.  This is true also of the agreements  concerning interconnection  charges,  that was
reached only after the sale of the license.  Moreover,  the fact that Sentel was operating only on
a pre-paid  basis,  and not with  a regular  subscription  system,  was  regarded  by  many  as an
indication  that  it  was  not  planning  to  spend  much  for  acquiring  a  secure  position  in  the
market.  Nevertheless,  Sentel  had attracted 45 000  subscribers at the time of this decision, and
a  transitory phase  has been  granted by  the  government,  where  Sentel  is  allowed to  operate
without a license. It was then announced that a new round of negotiation would be opened, for
an undefined  period, at the end of which the license would be sold again, probably by auction.
Sentel was to be compensated for its investments,  at a price decided by an independent expert,
accepted by the  two parties.  However,  the  government  complained  about  Sentel  not  having
followed  the planned  procedure  of agreement  for all its  choice of equipment,  in  agreement
with the  concession  contract,  and  wanted to use this  in  due  course  as  an  argument  against
Sentel.
After  the  Minister  of  Communication,  Mamadou  Diop  Decroix  gave  a  press
conference  on  October  16,  giving  more  precision  about the  government's  reasons  for this
decision, the Sentel company circulated  a response,  contesting most of the govenmment points.
One excerpt from this response is worth citing. A precise point in the Minister's communique
claims  that Sentel had not paid the amount required for the use of the GSM channel,  i.e. CFA
F 50 million per year.  He mentioned  a series of other points,  including  some  other payments
that Sentel  had failed  to effect.  The response by  Sentel epitomizes  the problems raised  by a
privatization  process  performed  in  a  weak  institutional  environment:  "Sentel  has paid  this
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letter  signed by the Minister of Culture and Communication  dated  10/07/2000  under the ref.
01367  - MCC/IT".  Apparently,  the government  had never  seen this money,  although it was
paid on the Sonatel account at the BICIS. No judicial verification  of this, and other payments
claimed  to have  been  effected  by  Sentel,  seems  to  have been  done  before  the  decision  to
withdraw  was  imposed.  Many  other examples  of contradictory  claims  are  made by the  two
sides,  while  the  decision  seemed  irreversible.  Although  no  expert  has  been  sent  by  the
government to verify  Sentel's claims,  it seems that their response is based on easily verifiable
information.  Among  others, the French and the US embassies have responded  swiftly to the
announcement  of the  withdrawal  of Sentel's  license,  the  US  State  Department  expressing
openly  some  serious  concern,  while  the  French  Foreign  Affairs  Ministry  condemned  this
action immediately.  The government's  case  turned out to be pretty weak, as its allegations of
'heavy  faults'  were  easily  refutable,  so  that  a  phase  of  negotiation  about  a  financial
compensation  started.
Some  additional  light  on these  events  is provided  by  a technical  factor,  namely that
Alizee and Sentel together are occupying more than 90 % of the 900 band,  so that the sale of a
third  license  would  have  a low  market  value  unless  it  went  into  the  1800  Mhz  spectrum,
which requires more expensive investments.  In fact, Sentel had purchased 2 x  12.5 Mhz, or 64
channels,  while Alizee had bought 2  x  10 Mhz, or 50 channels. The remaining spectrum space
was 2  x 2.5 Mhz, not enough to support a third operator  acting only in the  900 band.  Hence,
preventing  Sentel from operating could be seen as a potential way of increasing  the value of a
possible third license, if the sale of the second one (Sentel's) was precluded  until the judicial
process came to a close.
A new debate had been open for a while in governmental  circles  about the first license
bought by Aliz6e  for 1 symbolic  franc,  according  to some  sources,  just before  Sonatel  was
privatized.  Others  claim  that the  Aliz6e license  was simply included  in the Sonatel  package
that was privatized,  and  for which France Telecom  paid CFA  francs  70 billion  for its share.
On October  16,  the  Minister  of Communication  Mamadou  Diop  Decroix  announced  that a
denunciation  of the  contract  with  Sonatel  was  not  impossible.  Many  remember  that  the
38director  of  Studies  and  Regulation  at  the  Ministry  of Communications,  Cheikh  Tidiane
Diongue,  had  then  offered  his  resignation  to  the  Minister,  Serigne  Diop,  because  of  an
irregular procedure  having been pursued for transmitting the submission files to the applicants
for buying Sonatel, resignation which had not been accepted.  In a letter dated  14 August 1996,
in which he  complained  about these  facts, he  declared  facing 'a problem of conscience with
respect to the values of honesty and the principle of transparency  in which he believed',  letter
that was published by the newspaper Le Sud. However,  the idea of taking some action against
Sonatel  has  been  dropped,  considering  that  the  current  owner  really  bought  the  mobile
operator company as part of the Sonatel package.
In  April  2001,  a  settlement  seemed  to  be  in  view.  The  'heavy  fault'  charge  against
Sentel  was dropped, and the latter would be given its license back, against a financial  transfer.
Moreover,  Alizee  would  in  fact  be  charged  by  the  same  amount.  In  other  words,  the
government  would  eventually  accept  the  status  quo  in  return  for  a  'retrospective  spectrum
fee'.  The  sums required  are  not yet known.  Moreover,  the  sale  of a third  license  is  under
study,  involving admittedly an expensive extension of the new entrant into the  1800 band.
Sovereign Contracts and the Fight  against  Corruption
This series  of actions  taken  by  the  Senegalese  government  against  newly privatized
firms  may be regarded by some as a legitimate action  against corruption, while others  would
complain  that the  Senegalese  government  is undermining  irreversibly  its capacity  to commit
credibly to a contract with the private sector in the future.  After all,  Sentel's  license has been
withdrawn unilaterally,  while the legal regulatory agency, the ART, is still to be created,  as the
existing draft of the law has never been presented to the vote of the parliament. The 'Direction
de la R6glementation'  was the acting regulator,  and should in fact have been left in charge of
evaluating the breach of contract,  and  of applying  the appropriate  sanctions.  However,  it has
only been involved in the decision peripherally, on its own admission, and the government has
over-ruled all  the existing procedures.  In particular,  the International  Chamber of Commerce
of Paris has  not been approached,  although  it was the designated authority  for arbitrating any
conflict.  This illustrates vividly how difficult it is to sign a credible  contract  with a  sovereign
entity.  One  may even  argue  that the uncertainty  surrounding  the  commitment  ability of the
39Senegalese govenmment might have been instrumental  in deterring the private companies  from
investing  in equipment  as much  as planned,  as the  govenmment  was  probably  perceived  as
being unable  to  tie its  own  hands  credibly.  In particular,  the  investors  might have assigned
some  probability  to  the  change  of  government,  while  the  new  government  was  deemed
unlikely to  feel  bound by the  previous one's agreements.  Under these  'hold-up'  conditions,
one may argue that the low (official) prices paid for the licenses,  and other related expenses,
was  an  equilibrium  price,  the  discount  granted  implicitly  reflecting  the  high probability  of
reversal  of the sovereign contract, as vividly illustrated in another  context by the debt crisis of
the 1  980s. This can be understood better with the help of the following simple model.
Because of the widespread  sensitivity to the corruption issue, largely publicized by the
debates over 'good govemance'  all over the world, despite its fuzziness, it is very likely that a
government  will very probably get away with a reversal  of its decision to  sell an asset to the
private sector, if the price paid for it by the buyer is low.  Such a move could even be regarded
favorably  in this  case  by the intemational  community  as a signal  of the govemment's  drive
against  corruption.  An  accusation  of  corruption  would  be  less  likely  to  attract  the
understanding  of the intemational  community if the asset had been purchased  at a high price.
Therefore,  the govemment  is  likely to  get away pretty  well if it breaches  a contract  for  the
privatization  of an asset that has been paid  at a low price,  whereas  it is liable  to get various
forms of sanctions  from the intemational  community  when reneging on a contract which has
been paid at a price widely regarded as reasonable.  Among the latter, a  fall in the rating of the
country  as an  investment risk is  likely to be  especially damaging.  Hence,  the  govemment  is
more  likely to breach  a privatization  contract  when it has entailed a  small (official)  payment
for  it.  This  behavioral  assumption  is  described  by  the  curve  ,z(P)  in  figure  3,  where  or
represents the probability of the government  reneging on the privatization  contract,  and P the
price paid by the buyer.  Its S-shape captures  the idea that there is a range of prices that seem
'reasonable',  and below which  the probability  of a breach  of contract increases rapidly, while
above  that  range,  the  probability  being  already  low,  the  odds  are  strongly  tilted  against
reversal. However, because of the sovereign character of one of the parties to the contract,  it is








Figure 3  Equilibrium Breach of Privatization Contract
Assume that the buyer has rational  expectations,  and  is able to anticipate  correctly,  up
to some random  error,  this probability.  Then,  it is  sensible to assume  that the buyer  will be
prepared  to  pay  a  lower  price  for  the  asset,  the  higher  this  probability.  This  behavioral
assumption  is captured  by the P(xz  curve  in figure  3, representing the price that the  buyer is
willing  to  pay  as  a function  of the  expected  probability  of the government  breaching  the
contract.  It  has  naturally  a negative  slope,  as a  lower  probability  of breaching  commands  a
higher price,  and  it is drawn  as a straight  line  for simplicity.  However,  two  important points
are  captured  by this curve:  (i)  there  is certainly  a maximum  price that the  buyer would  be
prepared  to pay, even if the probability of a breach was to fall to zero, because the returns to
the asset are finite, and (ii) the buyer is probably-prepared  to pay a positive price for the asset,
even if the  probability of breach  of contract  reaches  1;  as the application  of the international
law,  with  the  support  of various  international  institutions,  would  probably  result  in  some
compensations  being paid to the  firm  in the case  where the government  reneges.  Moreover,
the  firm  might  be  allowed  to  operate  profitably  for a while,  before  the  breach  of contract
occurs.  This  determines  one  of the  parameters  of the  model,  that  determines  in  turn  the
relative positions of the two curves.
41In the case  represented  in figure  3,  we have two  stable equilibria,  denoted El  and E2.
The  former has  a  high probability  of reversal,  coupled  with a low  equilibrium  price  of the
asset;  the  latter has  exactly  the  opposite  characteristics,  namely  a  low reversal  probability,
coupled with a high price.  No groping  towards an equilibrium  is required  if the government
has a satisfactory knowledge of the parameters  governing the behavior of the  two players,  up
to  some random  error,  and  the  sale of the  asset may be  organized  as  a  fixed-price  'beauty
contest',  as occurred  in the case of the Sentel license.  This reflects the  'eductive  property'  of
rational  expectations  (Guesnerie,  1992).  Notice  that the  El-type  equilibrium  is  unlikely  to
exist if the required compensation for the breach of  contract is credibly set high enough.
Then, in the low-price  equilibrium,  it is plausible that an investor who is aware  of the
high probability  of the breach of contract will not engage in a high level investment program,
whereas  in the  high-price  equilibrium,  the investor  will rationally  feel  more  secure,  and  will
invest more.  Therefore,  as in the case of Senegal,  the low investment outlays by the firm may
be  used  additionally  by  the  govermment  as  an  excuse  for  breaching  the  contract,  in
equilibrium.  Therefore,  the  fact that  the  government  is  selling  the  privatized  asset at  a  low
price may be regarded  as an inefficient equilibrium deterrent for the privatized  firm to engage
in any massive investment  program,  an hence  as a brake  on the expansion  of the sector.  This
is a testable hypothesis, but its econometric analysis falls outside the scope of this paper,  as  it
requires a large number of observations.
426. Conclusion
The  analysis  of the  telecom  sector  reform  process  in  Sen6gal  offers  a  series  of
interesting lessons  about the political economics  of privatization  and liberalization.  There was
first  a reform  in  1985  that  restructured  the  sector and  created  a public  monopoly over the
telecommunications.  On  a  'before-after'  basis,  this  reform  appears  to  have  been  a  success,
with  a sizable  expansion  of the  network,  and  a significant  improvement  in  the  quality  of
service.  However,  under  the  pressure  of  the  potential  competition  available  on  the
intemational  market,  these  achievements  were  regarded  as  insufficient  by the  Senegalese
govemment.  The political elite  was afraid  of becoming  unable  to resist the possible  lobbying
by the  multinational  firms  operating  in  Senegal,  were  the  public  monopoly  to  fall  too  far
behind  the  intemational  standards  of  service.  Then,  a  decade  after  the  first  reform,  the
govenmment  decided to privatize  and  to liberalize  the sector,  in order to keep  it abreast with
technological progress.
The public monopoly was partially privatized, with about 33 %,  and then 42 %j of the
shares  sold to France  Telecom.  While the monopoly over the fixed line service  was kept, two
licenses  have been delivered for the mobile phone segment of the market.  Other services, like
Intemet  operations  and other  'value  added'  activities  have been liberalized  even  further.  The
govemment had to give away quite a lot to the trade unions in order to get its project through.
The  workers  thus  acquired  10  % of the  capital  of the privatized  company,  which  they kept
grouped  under  the  control  of  a  new  company  that  they  created,  the  'Senegalaise  des
Telecommunications',  in order to have a voice in the board. They bought their shares at a very
concessional  rate,  with  a  45  %  discount  and  an  interest-free  loan.  In  temis  of technical
efficiency,  the impact of privatization  on Sonatel  does not seem statistically significant,  while
the privatized firm expanded drastically the network, and substituted capital for labor.
Just before privatization,  the Sonatel company got a license to operate a cellular phone
department,  which became  a subsidiary shortly after.  Then,  a second license was issued,  and
sold at a  fixed price to  a subsidiary of the US company Millicom International, called Sentel.
However,  the price  officially paid  by this  company was  regarded  as pretty low  by the  new
government,  which took over in March  2000,  and this  prompted  the  latter  to withdraw  the
43license,  without negotiation, along with other reversals  in the privatization  process elsewhere
in the  economy.  Although  covert,  or implicit, accusations  of corruption  against the previous
govemment are widespread,  no judicial procedure seems to be planned to establish the reality
of this matter.  Out of an 80  pages  contract,  the Sentel  company  is bound  to  have breached
some of the clauses,  and its chances of reversing the withdrawal  decision are nil. A new round
of bidding  was planned for a while to be opened for selling the  license again.  Eventually,  it
seems  that  the  two  mobile  operators  will  simply  have  to  pay  a  fixed  charge  to  the  new
govemment, as the price for retuming to the status quo.
This 'Sentel shock' provides an illuminating example of the risks incurred by a private
party in contracting  with a  sovereign  entity,  which had been illustrated before  vividly by the
debt  crisis  of the  early  1980s.  A  sovereign  govemment  might  sometimes  not  resist  the
temptation  to  exchange  a  short-run political  advantage  for a longer-term  serious problem  of
credibility,  in order to increase  its financial  resources in the short run. However,  a little game-
theoretic  analysis  suggests that the 'victims'  of this kind of govemmental  decisions  to renege
on past engagements  are  'adult and  consenting',  in the  sense that the  probability of such a
decision  being  taken  is  plausibly  taken  into  account  at  the  time  of the  purchase,  at  an
equilibrium  price. This  is suggested by the fact that foreign firms seem to restrict investment
when  the price they paid for the privatized  asset is too low.  At least, the  limited experience
offered by the study of the Senegalese  case, which  contains only two  instances,  suggests this
hypothesis, which deserves to be tested on a larger sample.
44Notes
1. All the translations from the French are by Jean-Paul  Azam, and have not been certified by
the original authors.
2.  Of course, gossip has it that these 5 % shares were  reserved for cronies of the president, but
it is impossible to verify this claim.
3. The results are  almost identical when this equation  is estimated  by instrumenting  the  two
inputs  by  their  lagged  value,  despite  the  entailed  loss  of one  observation  in  so doing.
Similarly,  the  coefficient  stability  tests  are  almost  identical  when  taking  1997  as  the
breakpoint.
4.  Ibid.
Appendix:  Pre-Devaluation  Financial Data
Table A.1  Pre-Devaluation Financial Results of Sonatel (1987-93)
_____  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993
Turnover  19.0  20.1  23.7  27.2  30.1  35.0  38.1
Value  15.9  17.9  20.1  23.1  27.1  30.1  34.1
A  dded  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Personnel  na  na  na  5.2  5.8  6.7  6.4
C o  st_  _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _
Invest-  11.4  11.7  15.5  4.3  11.4  16.4  6.9
ments
Personnel  na  1 942  1 933  1 937  1 913  1 927  1  910
(Number)
Note: Current CFA F billion, except Personnel.
Sources:  Sonatel, May 1995 and May 1996.
45Table A.2: Data for the Econometric Estimations
Date  VA  Defl  Person  Lines  Date  VA  Defl  Person  Lines
1987  15.9  100  2030  26548  1994  51.7  141.2  1854  75024
1988  17.9  102.1  1942  28933  1995  46.6  151.9  1786  81988
1989  20.1  103.1  1933  36166  1996  52.9  156.4  1467  95063
1990  23.1  103.7  1937  40413  1997  57.1  164.2  1346  115902
1991  27.1  104.3  1913  48469  1998  74.0  173.6  1070  139549
1992  30.1  105.5  1927  58095  1999  79.7  182.4  1052  165874
1993  34.1  106.0  1910  64055
Table A.3: Inter-Connection  Charges
Normal Time  Nights and Week Ends
National
Mobile to Fixed
Local  23.6  14.8
Simple Transit  52  32.5
Double Transit  70.9  44.6
Fixed to Mobile
Share of Fixed  65  40.7
Share of Mobile  101.66  42.63
International
(expressed as % discount on Sonatel Charge)
Mobile to International  - 11  %  - 8.5 %
International  to Mobile  - 15 %  - 15 %
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